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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reform of the U.S. corporate tax system is again on the agenda.  Despite 
important differences, many current proposals share two common goals: (1) 
reducing the statutory corporate tax rate to improve U.S. “international 
competitiveness” and (2) broadening the corporate tax base by reducing or 
eliminating business expenditures to offset revenue losses.1  Given the 
significance of the passthrough sector and the relationship between 
individual and corporate taxes, however, such reforms need to be considered 
within a broader context.2  Part II of this Article discusses the growing 
 *  Karen C. Burke, Richard B. Stephens Professor, University of Florida Levin College of 
Law, and Visiting Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.  I would like to thank my co-
panelists Steven Bank, Michael Schler, and Martin Sullivan, and participants at the Pepperdine Law 
Review & Tax Analysts symposium Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration on January 
18, 2013.  This article is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the 
Second Obama Administration symposium, co-sponsored by Tax Analysts. 
 1.  See, e.g., H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2011 
(Discussion Draft 2011) (Camp proposal); WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREAS. REP., THE 
PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM (2012) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK] (Obama 
proposal); cf. Jane G. Gravelle, Does the Concept of Competitiveness Have Meaning in Formulating 
Corporate Tax Policy?, 65 TAX L. REV. 323, 323 (2012) (characterizing “international 
competitiveness” as “a concept that is almost always simply asserted and virtually nowhere 
defined”). 
 2.  See George A. Plesko & Erin E. Henry, Some Devilish Details of Corporate Tax Reform, 21 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 382, 383 (2012).  See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 4298, 
TAXING BUSINESSES THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX (2012) [hereinafter CBO, TAXING 
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significance of the passthrough sector, which now accounts for roughly half 
of net business income.  Part III explores new incentives for retaining 
corporate earnings and mischaracterizing labor income that would arise from 
an increase in individual income tax rates coupled with a simultaneous 
decrease in corporate tax rates, and considers the feasibility of measures to 
curb such sheltering within corporations.  Finally, Part IV urges Congress to 
look beyond reducing business expenditures to expand the corporate tax 
base and recommends consideration of an entity level tax on certain large 
partnerships. 
II.  RISE OF PASSTHROUGHS 
Prior to the 1986 Act, the two-tier corporate tax system often functioned 
as “a shelter rather than a burden.”3  Even though corporate income was 
taxed twice—once at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level—
the effective tax rate was often less than the highest statutory rate for 
corporations (46%).4  Distributions qualifying for capital gain treatment bore 
at most a 20% tax, which could be avoided entirely if the stock were held 
until death.5  The 1986 Act largely eliminated the use of corporations as 
shelters by setting the corporate tax rate (34%) higher than the individual 
rate (28%) and taxing capital gains at the same rate as ordinary income.6  
The increased relative burden of the corporate tax encouraged self-help 
integration through the use of passthroughs, as well as the expansion of 
publicly traded “master limited partnerships.”7  In 1987, Congress sought to 
prevent further erosion of the corporate tax base by enacting § 7704, which 
classifies a publicly traded partnership as a corporation, subject to a passive 
income exception.8 
Following the 1986 Act, individual income tax rates rose, narrowing the 
differential between the corporate and individual rates and eventually 
surpassing the corporate rate in 1993.  In 2003, parity was established 
between the maximum corporate and individual rates, and dividends were 
BUSINESSES]. 
 3.  Peter C. Canellos, Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By Default?, in CORPORATE 
TAX REFORM: A REPORT OF THE INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUBCHAPTER C 129, 135 (George 
K. Yin & George Mundstock eds., 1988). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Thus, assuming a 20% capital gains rate, the maximum combined corporate and shareholder 
tax burden (56.8%) was not significantly above the top personal income rate (50%).  Id. 
 6.  The 1986 Act also repealed the so-called General Utilities doctrine, which allowed 
corporations to distribute appreciated property without recognition of corporate level gain.  See Gen. 
Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
 7.  See Canellos, supra note 3, at 136. 
 8.  See I.R.C. § 7704(a), (d). Unless otherwise indicated, all I.R.C. citations refer to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended through January 2, 2013. 
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temporarily taxed at the same rate as long-term capital gain.  The 
shareholder level tax on distributions generally makes corporations less 
attractive than passthroughs, which have become more widely available.9  In 
1988, the Internal Revenue Service recognized that state-law limited-liability 
companies (LLCs) could be classified as partnerships for tax purposes.10  
The enactment of § 7704 helped to facilitate the check-the-box regulations, 
finalized in 1997, which allow unincorporated private business firms to 
freely elect corporate or partnership status.11  By eliminating the linkage 
between organizational form and tax status, the check-the-box regulations 
undermine the justification for multiple passthrough regimes.12 
Passthroughs have clearly become the vehicle of choice for nonpublicly 
traded businesses.  Prior to 1986, partnerships were popular mainly as tax-
shelter vehicles because of the opportunity to pass through losses and credits 
to passive investors.  The 1986 limitations on passive losses temporarily 
reduced the attractiveness of partnerships.13  Now partnerships are 
increasingly used by profitable ventures, with their share of net business 
income rising from 3% in 1980 to 21% in 2008.14  In part, this trend reflects 
the increasing popularity of LLCs and other limited-liability entities taxed as 
partnerships under the default classification rules.  During this period, the 
share of net income received by all passthroughs rose from 21% to 50%.15 
Following the 1986 Act, commentators predicted the demise of S 
corporations, which are simpler but less flexible than partnerships.  
Nevertheless, these entities have proven enormously popular.  Between 1980 
and 2006, the percentage of businesses organized as S corporations tripled, 
increasing from 4.2% to 12.6%.16  The growth of S corporations is partly 
 9.  If dividends are taxed at 15%, the maximum combined corporate and shareholder tax burden 
is 44.75%.  See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (1988). 
 11.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2012). 
 12.  Nevertheless, simplification of the entity classification rules has no political constituency.  
See Williard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and the Entity Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 
1, 32 (2010) (noting that the major passthrough industries have lobbying agendas that are likely to 
lead only to greater complexity). 
 13.  See I.R.C. § 469. 
 14.  See Jane G. Gravelle & Thomas L. Hungerford, Corporate Tax Reform: Should We Really 
Believe the Research?, 121 TAX NOTES 419, 421 (2008). 
 15.  Id.  This figure includes sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations.  The rise of 
passthroughs was also spurred by the shift to a service-based economy.  See CBO, TAXING 
BUSINESSES, supra note 2, at 10. 
 16.  See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40748, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHOICES: TAXATION AND RESPONSES TO LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 12 (2009).  Between 1980 and 
2008, the percentage of businesses (including sole proprietorships) organized as C corporations 
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attributable to legislation expanding the number and type of permissible 
shareholders.17  In addition, S corporations have an advantage in structuring 
employee-shareholder compensation because paying dividends in lieu of 
salary may avoid payroll taxes.18  Regardless of their level of participation, S 
shareholders are thus on a par with limited partners who are permitted to 
exclude their distributive share of partnership income from net self-
employment income.19  By contrast, general partners are subject to self-
employment tax on their distributive share of partnership income (with 
exceptions for specified types of income) on the theory that such partners are 
often actively engaged in the partnership’s trade or business.20  In the case of 
LLCs, it is unclear whether members should be treated as analogous to 
limited or general partners for employment tax purposes.21 
The emergence of private equity firms, typically organized as 
partnerships, has attracted widespread attention because of their favorable 
compensation arrangements and the seeming porousness of the publicly 
traded boundary.  The so-called “Blackstone bill” would classify as a 
corporation any publicly traded partnership that derives income from asset 
management or investment advisory services.22  The proposed legislation is a 
rifle-shot response to an aggressive planning technique, involving the use of 
“blocker corporations” interposed between an active business and a publicly 
traded entity to convert “bad” (nonqualifying) income into “good” 
(qualifying) income for purposes of the passive income exception under § 
7704.23  While this use of blockers was viewed as undermining the existing 
declined from 17% to 6%.  See also MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42726, THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR 
REFORM 7–8 (2012). 
 17.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (100 shareholder limit), (b)(3) (qualified Subchapter S 
subsidiary), (c)(1) (family members treated as a single shareholder), and (c)(6) (certain tax-exempt 
organizations). 
 18.  S shareholders are required to include “reasonable compensation” in their FICA tax base but 
are not subject to self-employment tax.  See David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008 
(8th Cir. 2012); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do It, 62 TAX LAW. 
749, 807 (2009) (suggesting that avoiding payroll tax “is a primary, perhaps the, primary force 
behind the use of S corporations”). 
 19.  See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).  The limited-partner exclusion is outmoded because state law 
generally no longer prevents limited partners from actively participating in the partnership’s 
business.  See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 97–99 (2005). 
 20.  See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1), (2), (3), (10). 
 21.  See Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 137 (2011) (LLP partners 
not treated as limited partners).  In 1997, Treasury proposed regulations that attempt to distinguish 
between active and inactive passthrough participants, but Congress imposed a moratorium on 
enforcement of the regulations.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402-2(a) (1997). 
 22.  See e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-62-07, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX 
TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART I 49–50 (2007). 
 23.  See Taylor, supra note 12, at 1 (describing a blocker (or stopper) as an entity whose 
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publicly traded line, the larger issue is whether the line itself is properly 
drawn.24 
Even though the passthrough sector includes many “small” businesses, 
large partnerships and S corporations account for a substantial portion of 
total assets and total receipts.  In 2009, partnerships with $100 million or 
more in assets constituted only 0.6% of all partnerships but held 72% of all 
partnership assets; S corporations with $100 million or more in assets 
constituted only 0.08% of all S corporations but held 36% of all S 
corporation assets.25  Total receipts are also disproportionately concentrated 
in a small number of large partnerships and S corporations.  While 
approximately 0.2% of partnerships reported gross receipts in excess of $50 
million in 2009, they accounted for 67% of total partnership receipts; the 
0.3% of S corporations with total receipts in excess of $50 million accounted 
for 35% of total S corporation receipts.26  By any standard, the upper 
echelons of partnerships and S corporations comprise very large firms.  Yet 
such entities escape the two-level corporate tax.27 
Passthrough income is disproportionately concentrated among high-
income individuals.  In 2006, taxpayers with adjusted gross income above 
$250,000 received 62% of all passthrough income.28  If taxes rise on net 
passthrough income, high-income individuals would bear the brunt of the tax 
increase.  Assuming corporate tax cuts are financed by allowing the top two 
individual rate brackets to revert to pre-2001 levels, the increase in the 
individual tax rate is estimated to affect only about 3% of small businesses.29  
insertion into a structure is intended to change the underlying character of the income (or assets) or 
otherwise achieve a tax result that would be unavailable without the use of multiple entities); see 
also id. (suggesting that use of the entity classification rules for this purpose may be immune from 
challenge under the economic substance doctrine). 
 24.  See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 142 (2009); id. at 143 
(noting that “future companies may not need public tradability if mechanisms emerge to create 
investor liquidity without it”). 
 25.  See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-66-12, SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CHOICE OF BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 11 (2012). 
 26.  See id. at 11–12. 
 27.  See Martin A. Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large Passthroughs as Corporations, 131 TAX NOTES 
1015, 1017 (2011) [hereinafter Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large Passthroughs] (criticizing the lack of a 
level playing field). 
 28.  See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43259, WHO EARNS PASS-THROUGH 
BUSINESS INCOME? AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA 3 (2012) [hereinafter 
Keightley, ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA] 
 29.  See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41392, SMALL BUSINESS AND THE 
EXPIRATION OF THE 2001 TAX RATE REDUCTIONS: ECONOMIC ISSUES 6 (2010).  The American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 effectively repeals the top two brackets but only for roughly the upper 
1% of taxpayers.  Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 102(b)(1), 126 Stat. 2313 (2013) [hereinafter ATRA] 
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A large portion of all passthrough income would be affected, however, 
because ownership of large passthroughs is concentrated among high-
bracket individuals.30  If corporate tax cuts are financed by reducing business 
tax preferences, passthroughs would be adversely affected, since most tax 
preference items used by corporations are also used extensively by 
passthroughs.31  Although the bulk of income earned by partnerships and S 
corporations is active income, these entities also report significant amounts 
of passive income—25% of total income for partnerships and 10% for S 
corporations, respectively.32  Beginning in 2013, such income is potentially 
subject to the 3.8% Medicare tax on unearned income.33  Passthroughs also 
account for a surprisingly high percentage of net long-term capital gains; 
between 1997 and 2007, the percentage of such gains attributable to 
passthroughs increased from 30.1% to 44.4%.34  Passthrough owners thus 
stand to lose significantly if the capital gain rate is increased.35 
While lower corporate tax rates appeal to business managers,36 
corporate-shareholder integration has little political support.  In 2003, the 
Bush administration initially proposed a version of the 1992 Treasury 
integration proposals that would have permitted exclusion of dividends at 
the shareholder level, but only if such dividends were paid from previously 
taxed corporate income.37  Instead, Congress enacted a 15% rate for 
qualified dividend income regardless of whether such amounts were 
previously taxed at the corporate level.38  Simultaneously, in the guise of 
providing additional shareholder level relief, Congress reduced the rate on 
(modifying § 1(h)(1)(C) (15% rate) and adding new § 1(h)(1)(D) (20% rate)). 
 30.  See Martin A. Sullivan, Should We Raise Tax Rates on Wealthy Employers?, 132 TAX 
NOTES 979, 980 (2011). 
 31.  See Small Businesses and Tax Reform: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Select Revenue 
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Robert Carroll) 
[hereinafter Statement of Robert Carroll] (indicating that, between 2011 and 2015, passthroughs 
account for 22% of projected annual business tax expenditures totaling roughly $100 billion). 
 32.  See Keightley, ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA, supra note 28, at 6. 
 33.  See I.R.C. § 1411. 
 34.  See Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Capital Gains: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Way & Means and the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Leonard E. Burman).  
The growth of private equity funds and other investment partnerships may help to explain this shift. 
 35.  If the 2003 tax cuts had been allowed to expire, the rates for capital gains and dividends 
would have increased to 23.8% and 43.4%, respectively.  Instead, the ATRA maintains the 15% rate 
on capital gains and dividends for all but the highest earners, who now face a 23.8% rate.  See supra 
note 29. 
 36.  See Daniel Halperin, Mitigating the Potential Inequity of Reducing Corporate Tax Rates, 
126 TAX NOTES 641, 646 (2010).  European countries have also moved away from integration, while 
significantly lowering corporate tax rates and broadening the corporate tax base.  Id. 
 37.  See generally Karen C. Burke, Is the Corporate Tax System “Broken”?, 28 VA. TAX REV. 
341, 347–53 (2008); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 
VA. L. REV. 517 (2009). 
 38.  Burke, supra note 37, at 350. 
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capital gains regardless of whether such gains were derived from retained 
earnings.39  Thus, Congress created an unstable situation in which a 
temporary dividend tax cut potentially encouraged dividend payouts in 
anticipation of a future increase in the dividend tax rate.40  Reducing 
corporate tax rates would undermine the rationale for the 2003 tax cuts as a 
way of mitigating the double level tax burden on corporate earnings.  By 
contrast, increasing the rate on dividends and capital gains could help to 
finance lower corporate rates and improve progressivity.41 
III.  SHELTERING WITHIN CORPORATIONS 
If corporate tax rates fall and individual tax rates rise, C corporations 
could again become attractive as tax shelters, reversing the 
“disincorporation” phenomenon that followed the 1986 Act.  While such a 
“reincorporation” strategy may appear counterintuitive, its attractiveness 
would depend on the disparity between the maximum individual and 
corporate tax rates and the ability to defer (or avoid) the shareholder level 
tax on distributed corporate income.42  Reducing the combined corporate-
shareholder tax burden could also impair the overall level of progressivity.43  
Increasing taxes on net passthrough income could have the opposite effect, 
since such income is concentrated among high-bracket individuals and the 
tax burden may not be easily shifted.  Nevertheless, passthrough owners can 
be expected to press to keep rates low for noncorporate net business income, 
while resisting any effort to shift the cost of corporate tax reform to the 
passthrough sector. 
While it might be possible, in theory, to limit corporate rate reductions 
to publicly traded entities for which concerns about international 
competitiveness are most plausible, such an outcome seems politically 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Stephen A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 
573.  Although the ATRA averted decoupling of the tax rates for dividends and capital gains, it 
remains to be seen how stable the compromise will prove.  See supra note 35. 
 41.  See generally Rosanne Altshuler et al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a 
Global Economy, TAX POL’Y CENTER, May 12, 2010 (arguing that restoring the pre-1997 rates on 
capital gains and dividends would enhance progressivity and permit a reduction in the corporate tax 
rate from 35% to 26%). 
 42.  Passthrough taxation would remain attractive to allow losses and tax-preferred income to 
pass through. 
 43.  See Gravelle & Hungerford, supra note 14, at 428–33 (discussing recent empirical work on 
the incidence of the corporate tax).  See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34229, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2012). 
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unrealistic.  A more likely outcome would be reduced tax rates for all C 
corporations, including closely held corporations.  Permitting closely held 
corporations to benefit from reduced rates would greatly magnify the tax 
shelter problem.  Under current law, there is generally no reason for a new 
business to elect corporate form except to exploit the low rate brackets for 
the first $75,000 of corporate income.44  If corporate rates are significantly 
reduced, eliminating the low rate brackets should be given serious 
attention.45  Graduated rates are not needed to provide a special benefit to 
small businesses, which can elect Subchapter S status or be taxed as a 
partnership by default.  Moreover, many small businesses may be owned by 
high-income individuals who would otherwise be taxed at the maximum 
individual rate.  A more far-reaching proposal would be to limit Subchapter 
C to publicly traded corporations and their subsidiaries, reducing the need 
for anti-abuse provisions.46 
If corporate tax rates are cut, the preferential rate should not be extended 
to business income generally.47  The justification for preferential treatment 
of all business income is that the corporate tax functions essentially as a tax 
on capital income, and hence lower rates should logically apply to 
noncorporate net business income as well.48  The drive to reduce corporate 
tax rates, however, is based on the need to improve international 
competitiveness, not the desirability of reducing taxes on capital income 
generally.  Nevertheless, corporate tax reform may falter politically because 
of well-organized opposition from the passthrough sector.  The main 
concern is that the passthrough sector would be harmed by eliminating tax 
preferences to finance corporate tax reform, since passthroughs would lose 
the preferences but would not benefit from the lower corporate rate.49  
 44.  See I.R.C. § 11(b). 
 45.  See generally Steven A. Bank, Taxing Bigness, TAX L. REV (forthcoming 2013) (tracing the 
history of the graduated corporate tax rate); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Repeal of Graduated Corporate 
Tax Rates, 131 TAX NOTES 1395 (2011); cf. John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the 
Business Tax Entities Universe: “Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do,” 78 TEX L. 
REV. 885, 978 (2000) (“In fact, lobbyists for small private C corporations fight fiercely and 
effectively for the preservation and expansion of the inside shelter from lower graduated 
rates . . . .”). 
 46.  See George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Reform, Finally, After 100 Years, in TOWARD TAX 
REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 114, 115 (Tax Analysts ed. 
2009). 
 47.  Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 50–51 (2007) 
(proposing carving out business income of passthrough entities for a “special reduced business tax 
rate as part of the individual income tax”; the special rate would be set equal to the maximum 
corporate rate). 
 48.  See Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 Nw. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 41, 42 (2010). 
 49.  See Statement of Robert Carroll, supra note 31, at 7 (warning of the “potential for 
undesirable side effects”); MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: TAXING PROFITS IN 
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Enthusiasm for cutting corporate tax rates may well splinter over the issue of 
which (if any) preferences should be reduced or eliminated.50 
Even if corporate tax rates are cut, corporate earnings would still be 
subject to a shareholder level tax when distributed.  Taxing distributions 
could help to minimize revenue losses from lower corporate rates and 
prevent erosion of the individual income tax base.  For example, assume that 
the maximum individual rate is increased to 40%, the maximum corporate 
rate is reduced to 25%, and a “distribution tax” of 20% is levied on all 
corporate distributions to individual shareholders.  If a corporation earns 
$100 and pays $25 tax, a distribution of the after-tax amount ($75) would 
attract a distribution tax of $15 at the shareholder level, yielding a combined 
corporate-shareholder tax burden of 40% equal to the maximum individual 
rate.51  The combination of the two taxes yields the same aggregate burden 
as taxing income only once at the shareholder’s rate.  The “split-rate” 
approach is attractive because it could accommodate a range of corporate 
and distribution tax rates.52  The lower the corporate tax rate, however, the 
higher the distribution tax rate that would be needed to achieve the desired 
combined tax burden.53  As a practical matter, a high distribution tax rate 
(and low corporate tax rate) would greatly exacerbate tax planning aimed at 
deferring or avoiding the second level of tax, while enhancing the benefit of 
reinvesting retained earnings within the corporation. 
To ensure a uniform tax burden on distributed corporate earnings, 
capital gains and dividends should be taxed at the same rate.  If the capital 
THE 21ST CENTURY 109 (2011) (“One of the most difficult political hurdles for corporate tax reform 
is its potentially negative effect on pass-through businesses.”). 
 50.  See Jane G. Gravelle, Practical Tax Reform for a More Efficient Income Tax, 30 VA. TAX 
REV. 389, 402–03 (2010) (even eliminating nearly all business tax expenditures would only allow 
the corporate tax rate to be reduced by a few percentage points); Heather M. Rothman, As Details 
Emerge, Business Community Could Split on Tax Reform, Practitioner Says, 172 DAILY TAX REP., 
Sept. 6, 2012, at G-2. 
 51.  The shareholder would be left with $60, the same amount that would be available after tax if 
passthrough income of $100 were taxed at a 40% rate.  To equate the burden on distributed corporate 
income and passthrough income, the distribution rate (d) would need to be set equal to (pc)/(1c) 
where p is the shareholder’s marginal tax bracket and c is the corporate tax.  See Halperin, supra 
note 36, at 645 n.23. 
 52.  For example, it would be possible to maintain roughly the pre-2013 burden on distributed 
corporate earnings (44.75%) by setting the corporate and distribution tax rate both at 25%.  See id. at 
644 n.16.  The shareholder would owe a tax of $18.75 on $75 distribution ($100$125 corporate 
tax), resulting in a combined burden of 43.75%.  Under the ATRA, the combined burden is roughly 
50.5%, assuming dividends are taxed at 23.8%.  See supra note 29. 
 53.  To maintain a 44.75% combined corporate-shareholder burden, a 15% corporate tax rate 
would require a distribution tax rate of 35%.  The shareholder would owe a tax of $29.75 on the $85 
distribution ($100$115 corporate tax), resulting in a combined burden of 44.75%. 
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gain rate is lower than the dividend rate, shareholders have an incentive to 
withdraw earnings in nondividend transactions.  Given the current parity of 
the capital gain and dividend rates, the distinction between dividend and 
nondividend distributions often matters only for purposes of basis recovery.  
If the rate parity proves permanent, it may be possible to eliminate 
provisions designed to police the boundary between dividend and 
nondividend distributions.54  Basis recovery continues to be important, 
however, if a shareholder has a high basis.  If stock is held until death, the § 
1014 basis step-up affords an easy escape from the distribution tax with 
respect to a shareholder’s share of undistributed corporate earnings and 
unrealized appreciation in corporate assets.55  Taxing distributions uniformly 
would require reducing the death time basis step-up and denying the full 
charitable deduction for contributions of appreciated corporate stock.56  Such 
reforms may be politically unrealistic, however, and would reintroduce the 
vexing problem of allocating income under a passthrough model. 
Taxing distributions would not eliminate the fundamental problem of 
sheltering within the corporation—namely, the ability to retain earnings and 
achieve a higher after-tax return on the reinvested earnings whenever the 
corporate rate is lower than the individual rate.57  Immediate distribution of 
corporate earnings accelerates the shareholder level tax, while retention 
defers the tax.  If investments inside the corporation earn the same after-tax 
return as investments outside the corporation, however, there is generally no 
advantage to deferral of the tax.58  Deferring distributions is advantageous, 
however, if the return on retained corporate earnings is taxed at a lower rate 
than the return on amounts invested outside the corporation.  While there is 
no advantage to deferring the distribution tax on the initial corporate 
earnings, the ability to earn a higher after-tax return on retained corporate 
earnings represents a permanent benefit that increases the longer amounts 
remain invested within the corporation.59  In the extreme case, if the 
corporate rate were set to zero, all corporations would essentially function as 
“special tax-free savings accounts.”60  Reinvested corporate earnings would 
grow tax-free and the accumulated return would be reduced only by the 
distribution tax. 
 54.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 302(b) (redemptions treated as exchanges). 
 55.  I.R.C. § 1014. 
 56.  See Halperin, supra note 36, at 654. 
 57.  See id. at 646. 
 58.  The cost of an immediate dividend distribution is equal to the discounted present value of 
the tax that would otherwise be due if earnings were retained and distributed as a dividend in the 
future. See generally Daniel Halperin, 2009 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College 
of Tax Counsel: Rethinking the Advantage of Tax Deferral, 62 TAX LAW 535 (2009). 
 59.  See Halperin, supra note 36, at 647–48. 
 60.  SHAVIRO, supra note 24, at xiii. 
09 BURKE SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:13 AM 
[Vol. 40: 1329, 2013] Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1339 
Under passthrough treatment, undistributed net business income would 
be taxed currently at the owner’s tax rate.  If the same business were 
incorporated, the profits and any accumulated earnings would be taxed 
currently only at the lower corporate rate, subject to a potential future 
distribution tax.  As under pre-1986 law, high-income individuals would 
have a strong incentive to use corporations as tax shelters, exploiting higher 
corporate after-tax returns while deferring the distribution tax.  Corporations 
could once again serve as incorporated pocketbooks for passive investments, 
heightening the significance of corporate “penalty” taxes.61 
Lower corporate tax rates would also encourage shareholder-owners to 
disguise compensation as dividends.  In the case of C corporations, the 
concept of “reasonable compensation” has focused mainly on the potential 
for excessive compensation.62  By contrast, undercompensation is apparently 
rampant in S corporations where owners have an incentive to avoid 
employment taxes by paying themselves minimal compensation and passing 
through the S corporation’s residual earnings as noncompensation income.63  
Significant revenue could be raised by extending the compensation rules for 
general partners to all members of passthrough entities—including LLCs, 
LLPs, and S corporations—who materially participate in the business.64  
Treating all active passthrough owners alike for compensation purposes 
would curtail the use of S corporations to reduce employment taxes. 
If corporate tax rates are reduced, it would also be desirable to 
harmonize the employment tax treatment of shareholders of S corporations 
and privately held C corporations.65  In the close corporation context, 
 61.  See I.R.C. §§ 531–37 (accumulated earnings tax), §§ 541–47 (personal holding company 
tax).  A more radical approach would be to tax all passive income earned through corporations at the 
maximum individual rate, though this approach could be viewed as penalizing investment in 
corporate form.  See Halperin, supra note 36, at 653. 
 62.  Under current law, personal service corporations are already taxed at the maximum 
individual rate.  See I.R.C. §§ 448(d)(2), 11(b)(2). 
 63.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-195, TAX GAP: ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
ADDRESS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH S CORPORATION TAX RULES 25 (2009) (estimating that, in 2003 
and 2004, S shareholders underreported compensation by roughly $23.6 billion). 
 64.  See PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX OPTIONS: 
SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 67 (2010).  Certain types of income, 
such as interest and rental income, would continue to be excluded from self-employment income.  
Cf. Schwidetzky, supra note 18, at 793–94 (arguing that the material participation standard is overly 
broad as applied to nonservice partnerships). 
 65.  See Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Employment Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
127, 149–50 (2009).  The number of owners dramatically affects the incentive to mischaracterize 
labor income as capital income.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 4168, THE TAXATION OF 
CAPITAL AND LABOR THROUGH THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 14 (2012); see also Nicholas Bull & 
Paul Burnham, Taxation of Capital and Labor: The Diverse Landscape by Entity Type, 61 NAT’L 
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disguising salary as dividends avoids payroll taxes and defers shareholder 
level tax until such amounts are distributed.  Reducing corporate tax rates 
significantly below the maximum individual rate would clearly exacerbate 
the failure of existing law to adequately police mistaxation of labor income.  
Using corporations to shelter labor income would not only reduce the 
individual income tax base but also erode the long-term solvency of the 
Social Security and Medicare trust funds.66 
IV.  PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS AND ENTITY CLASSIFICATION 
If integration of corporate-shareholder taxes is impractical or 
unattainable, mitigating the disparity between large passthroughs and 
corporations may be worth exploring.  Consistent with this goal, 
policymakers have expressed interest in taxing large passthroughs as 
corporations.67  These proposals reflect concern over the long-term decline 
in corporate tax revenues and the related rise of the passthrough sector.68  
The difference in tax treatment of otherwise identical firms based solely on 
their legal structure may also be perceived as inequitable.  Taxing large 
passthroughs as corporations could help to finance lower tax rates by 
broadening the corporate tax base.69  In turn, lower rates would mitigate the 
existing distortions under the two-level corporate tax.  The continued 
expansion of publicly traded partnerships and the growth of private equity 
suggest a need to rethink the public-trading line that demarcates corporate 
and noncorporate entities.70 
Critics claim that the large partnership proposal would reverse a 
consistent trend toward liberalizing access to passthrough taxation and 
TAX J. 397, 400–01 (2008); id. at 418 (estimating that the gap in reported labor income of business 
owners, not including C corporations with more than 75 shareholders, was $153.4 billion in 2002). 
 66.  Cf. Willard B. Taylor, Payroll Taxes—Why Should We Care?  What Should Be Done?, 137 
TAX NOTES 983, 996 (2012) (recommending integration of payroll taxes and individual taxes). 
 67.  See FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 10 (suggesting the need for “greater parity” in the 
treatment of large corporate and noncorporate entities). 
 68.  While corporate taxes accounted for nearly 30% of total federal taxes in 1953, they fell to 
less than 9% of total federal taxes in 2010.  See KEIGHTLEY & SHERLOCK, supra note 16, at 11; Jane 
G. Gravelle, The Corporate Tax: Where Has It Been and Where Is It Going?, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 903, 
903–04 (2004); see also CBO, TAXING BUSINESSES, supra note 2, at 15–19 (discussing implications 
of shift to passthroughs on federal tax revenues); Martin A. Sullivan, Passthroughs Shrink the 
Corporate Tax by $140 Billion, 130 TAX NOTES 987 (2011). 
 69.  Although the number of passthrough entities affected would likely be small, the proposal 
could potentially raise significant revenue because of the size of the affected firms. See MARK P. 
KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42451, TAXING LARGE PASS-THROUGHS AS 
CORPORATIONS: HOW MANY FIRMS WOULD BE AFFECTED? 2 (2012). 
 70.  See Hearing Before S. Fin. Comm. on the Taxation of Business Entities, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(statement of Alvin C. Warren). Of the nearly 100 publicly traded partnerships, most are 
concentrated in investment banking and energy-related industries.  See Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large 
Passthroughs, supra note 27, at 1016. 
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would move further away from the integration ideal.71  These objections may 
miss the mark, however.  Expansion of passthrough taxation is attributable 
largely to self-help integration, the rise of limited-liability entities, and 
lobbying on behalf of S corporations and other passthrough entities.  The 
enthusiasm for passthroughs also ignores notorious tax shelters—such as 
ACM, Castle Harbour, and Son-of-BOSS transactions—that manipulated the 
partnership rules to drain revenue from the corporate and individual tax 
bases.72  Although Congress has repeatedly sought to reform Subchapter K, 
well-meaning attempts to target particular abuses have often added 
complexity without deterring tax-motivated transactions.  Moreover, limiting 
the choice to double-level taxation or passthrough taxation poses a false 
dichotomy and ignores the realistic alternative of a single tax imposed 
exclusively at the entity level.73 
In the wake of the 1986 Act, exempting certain publicly traded 
partnerships from § 7704 might have seemed reasonable, given the 
perceived shortcomings of the two-level tax system.  If the alternative is a 
single tax imposed at the entity level, however, it is not clear that 
passthrough treatment continues to be warranted.  An entity level tax offers a 
more efficient and administrable approach that could improve compliance; 
taxes would be collected from a limited number of entities rather than from a 
much larger number of individual taxpayers.  In the late 1990s, the ALI 
project on classification and streamlining of private business organizations 
considered but ultimately rejected an entity level approach, while 
acknowledging that the “choice between conduit and entity taxation is a very 
close one.”74  Other commentators have concluded that complex private 
business enterprises should be subject to a single entity level tax when 
income is earned.75  These proposals were all premised on the notion that the 
 71.  See Philip F. Postlewaite, Raising Revenue Through Misguided Classification Reform, 136 
TAX NOTES 1177, 1180, 1187 (2012). 
 72.  ACM Partnership v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); TIFD III–E, Inc. v. United 
States, 666 F.3d 836 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Castle Harbour”).  See generally Karen C. Burke & Grayson 
M. P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter, 62 TAX LAW. 59, 64 (2008). 
 73.  See George K. Yin, Publicly Traded Partnerships, Closely Held Corporations and Entity 
Classification for Tax Purposes, 88 TAXES 329, 329 (2010). 
 74.  George K. Yin & David J. Shakow, Reforming and Simplifying the Income Taxation of 
Private Business Enterprises, in 3 J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-3-01, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE 
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION 220, 229 (2001). 
 75.  See generally Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX 
LAW. 229 (1998); Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future 
Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 249 (1999). 
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task of ascertaining the partners’ economic arrangement under Subchapter K 
in its current form is excessively burdensome. 
Subchapter K was never intended to accommodate interests that are 
widely held and frequently traded.  While Congress in 1997 enacted 
simplified reporting rules and a special audit regime for “electing large 
partnerships” with more than 100 partners, few partnerships make the 
election.76  Under current proposals, the large partnership audit rules would 
be mandatory for partnerships with more than 1,000 partners, but the 
simplified reporting rules would remain elective.77  Although the mandatory 
large partnership audit rules might mitigate existing inefficiencies, they 
would probably do little to overcome the perception that IRS auditors are 
often reluctant to audit partnerships and are limited in their ability to identify 
relevant technical issues. 
Very few widely held partnerships comply fully with the requirements 
of Subchapter K.78  Often these partnerships ignore technical compliance and 
resort to creative tax allocations to ensure fungibility of interests.  Some 
commentators assert that technical noncompliance does not necessarily pose 
a problem for the tax system, reasoning that the managers of widely held 
partnerships are seldom familiar with the tax profiles of particular investors 
and hence have little incentive to engage in strategic tax allocations to take 
advantage of disparities in tax characteristics.79  Unfortunately, such self-
serving claims are unverifiable because these entities routinely escape 
audit.80  More importantly, there are grounds for concern that certain types of 
partnerships operate under special rules outside the normal framework of 
Subchapter K. 
For example, securities partnerships are permitted to take advantage of 
special aggregation rules to comply with the requirements of § 704(c) with 
respect to allocations of built-in gain or loss.81  The exception to the § 704(c) 
rules is justified on the theory that, given the need for frequent revaluations 
and the large number of assets involved, asset-by-asset allocation would be 
unduly burdensome.  Recent tax bar proposals would expand the class of 
securities partnerships eligible to use special aggregation methods.82  In 
 76.  See I.R.C. § 775(a)(1); Eric B. Sloan & Matthew W. Lay, Beyond the Master Limited 
Partnership: A Comprehensive Review of Publicly Traded Partnerships, 88 TAXES 229, 295 (2010). 
 77.  See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-2-12, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN 
THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET PROPOSAL 622 (2012). 
 78.  See Yin, supra note 73, at 330–31. 
 79.  See id. at 331, 334 n.25. 
 80.  See Amy S. Elliott, Audit Proof? How Hedge Funds, PE Funds, and PTPs Escape the IRS, 
136 TAX NOTES 351 (2012). 
 81.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3) (2012). 
 82.  See generally NYSBA TAX SECTION, AGGREGATION ISSUES FACING SECURITIES 
PARTNERSHIPS UNDER SUBCHAPTER K (2010). 
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addition, such partnerships would be permitted to adjust basis under §§ 
734(b) and 743(b) on an aggregate (rather than asset-by-asset) basis 
following certain distributions and transfers of interests.83  Like the special 
aggregation rules for § 704(c), the exception to the basis adjustment rules is 
defended on the ground that compliance would be unduly burdensome.84 
Under current law, securities partnerships routinely employ so-called 
“stuffing allocations” to circumvent the basis adjustment rules.  Stuffing 
allocations (also referred to as “fill-up” or “fill-down” allocations) specially 
allocate taxable gain or loss to a withdrawing partner equal to that partner’s 
share of unrealized gain or loss in the partnership’s assets.85  The special 
allocation does not change the amount of gain (or loss) recognized by the 
withdrawing partner but may change the character of such gain (or loss).86  
By shifting taxable gain away from the other partners, the special allocation 
effectively allows them to deduct a portion of the purchase price of the 
redeemed partner’s interest.  If challenged, it seems highly unlikely that such 
allocations would be respected as satisfying the substantial economic effect 
test under the § 704(b) regulations.  Rather than sanctioning a de facto two-
track partnership regime to facilitate fungibility of actively traded 
partnership interests, it may be worthwhile to consider imposing an entity 
level tax on publicly traded partnerships and certain securities partnerships. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The 1986 Act reforms were politically feasible largely because they 
shifted a substantial portion of the individual tax burden to the corporate 
sector.  In contrast, current proposals for reducing corporate tax rates would 
in effect shift a portion of the corporate tax burden back to individuals.  
While simply lowering the corporate tax would clearly be regressive, such a 
reform could enhance overall progressivity if coupled with higher tax rates 
on dividends and capital gains.  A combined corporate-shareholder tax 
burden at least equal to the maximum individual rate would be essential to 
prevent corporations from reemerging as tax shelters and thereby eroding the 
personal income tax base.  As a result of self-help integration and the 
 83.  See id. at 16. 
 84.  See id. at 28. 
 85.  See id. at 35–36.  Because the stuffing allocation equalizes the distributee’s outside basis and 
the amount of cash distributed, the distribution does not trigger gain recognition under § 731(a); as 
result, no basis adjustment is required under § 734(b). 
 86.  See David S. Miller & Jean Bertrand, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Hedge Funds, Their 
Investors, and Their Managers, 65 TAX LAW. 309, 334 (2012). 
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proliferation of passthrough entities—each with its own powerful business 
constituency—the corporate tax has become essentially a tax on public 
trading.  Comprehensive reform should reconsider the boundaries between 
public and private business firms as well as the feasibility of a single entity 
level tax for entities that cannot easily comply with a passthrough regime. 
 
